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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DEER PARK TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, .. BOARD DECISION 
: AND ORDER 
Respondent, 
-and- Case No. U-4321 
DEER PARK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Charging Party. 
COOPER & ENGLANDER, ESQS. (by Robert E. 
Sapir, Esq., of Counsel) for Charging 
Party 
PAUL E. KLEIN, ESQ. (by Deborah Watarz, 
Esq., of Counsel) for Respondent 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Deer Park 
Union Free School District (District) to the hearing officer's 
decision dismissing its charge against the Deer Park Teachers 
Association (Association) on the ground that this Board lacks 
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. The charge, filed October 
25, 1979, alleges that the Association violated §209-a.2(b) of 
the Act in that it has refused to reduce to writing the agreement 
reached between the parties during negotiations for their current 
contract covering 1979-1982. The hearing officer concluded that 
the disagreement between the parties is one over a claimed ••::;••>. 
breach of agreement, which is beyond this Board's jurisdiction to 
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enforce. We conclude, however, that the undisputed facts 
establish a violation of §209-a.2(b) by the Association in that 
it has refused to execute a written agreement incorporating the 
agreement of the parties, as-required by §204.3 of the Act. 
' FACTS' 
Although no hearing has been held, the documents submitted 
by the parties reveal the following undisputed facts. After 
protracted negotiations, including a three-day strike, the 
parties, on October 4, 1979, signed a multi-page memorandum of 
agreement in which it was agreed that "all terms and conditions of 
the Collective Bargaining Agreement which expired on June 30, 1979 
shall remain in full force and effect up to and including June 30, 
1982, except as to its provisions which are herein contained:". 
The memorandum of agreement specifically refers to various 
articles and sections of the prior collective bargaining agreement, 
indicating the changes agreed upon. Included are numerous 
changes to: Article VII - Salaries and Additional Benefits. The 
memorandum of agreement contains the following language, which is 
the source of the instant dispute: 
"Article Vll-Section l,d--New service steps shall 
be incorporated into the salary schedule as follows: 
Beginning July 1, 1979 20th year $1,000 
Beginning July 1, 1981 add 24th year $1,000" 
Article Vll-Section 1 of the prior agreement is entitled "Salary 
Schedule". The "d" is a reference to the Association's bargaining 
proposals. Eighteen-step salary schedules for each of the three 
1 See: St. Lawrence County, 10 PERB 113058 (1977). 
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years of the contract are attached as appendices to the memoran-
dum of agreement. 
The memorandum of agreement was signed on behalf of both 
parties and was approved by the Board of the District and ratified 
by the members of the Association. The parties' practice has 
been to prepare a final written contract from such a memorandum 
of agreement. The Association is willing to sign a final written 
contract incorporating all unchanged terms and conditions of the 
prior contract and all changes agreed upon in the memorandum of 
agreement. 
The parties disagree, however, as to how the agreement with 
regard to the above quoted "Article VII-Section 1,d" shall be 
incorporated' in the final contract. The Association takes the 
position that it will not sign a final contract that amends the 
salary schedules to add the two agreed-upon service steps. It 
will only sign a final contract that incorporates, as written, 
the actual language of the memorandum of agreement. The District 
contends that this position of the Association constitutes a re-
fusal to execute a written agreement incorporating the agreement 
reached by the parties, and is, therefore, a refusal to negotiate 
in good faith, in violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Act. 
This dispute as to the form of the final contract is seen 
by the parties as affecting the substantive dispute between them. 
That dispute is as to whether the new "service steps" are subject 
to a previously negotiated two-year wage freeze in the prior con-
tract applicable to the prior salary schedule. The Association 
claims that the earlier wage freeze does not affect eligibility 
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for the new service steps and teachers are entitled to the addi-
tional salary specified when they start their 20th and 24tih year 
of teaching, respectively. It insists that these two steps should 
not be placed in the contract as two additional steps of the regu-
lar salary schedule. The District, on the other hand, contends 
that it was the intention of the parties that the new service steps 
would be treated in a like manner with all other steps in the sal-
ary schedule. Thus, under this view, a teacher would have to 
teach 22 years to be eligible for the "20th year" service incre-
ment, and 26 years to receive the "24th year" payment. 
As part of its charge, the District claims that the Associa-
tion agreed to the District's position during negotiations and 
demands that the Association be required to execute a final con-
tract incorporating lauguage to the effect that the new service 
steps be treated in a like manner with all other steps in the 
salary schedule. No such express language appears in the memo-
randum of agreement, nor is this issue directly alluded to in 
that document. 
The Association has demanded arbitration of its grievance 
that the District has failed to pay teachers in accordance with 
its interpretation of "Article Vll-Section l,d" of the memorandum 
of agreement. On April 12, 1980, Mr. Justice Gowan of Supreme 
Court, Suffolk County, denied the District's petition to stay 
this arbitration. 
DISCUSSION 
As noted above, the hearing officer found that the Associa-
tion's negotiating responsibility was completed when the parties 
Board - U-4321 -5 
signed and ratified the memorandum of agreement and the Associa-
tion agreed to include the actual language of the disputed item 
in the basic contract. He concluded that there is here present 
only a dispute as to the meaning and application of the language 
agreed upon. Since such a question would not be within our juris-
diction to resolve, he dismissed the/charge in its entirety. We 
-disagree. - - - -
This Board has long recognized that the duty to bargain in 
good faith includes the obligation of each party, when requested 
to do so by the other party, to execute a written contract after 
they have reached agreement concerning the terms and conditions 
of employment of the employees involved. Since 1977, that duty 
has been specifically incorporated in the Act in subdivision 3 of 
§204, which reads as follows: 
"3. For'the purpose of this-article, to negotiate 
collectively is the performance of the mutual 
obligations of the public employer and a recognized 
or certified employee organization to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to,wages, hours, and other terms and conditions 
of employment:, or'vthe negotiation of an agreement, 
or any question', arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written' agreement (incorporating' any agreement 
reached if requested by- either party, but such 
obligation does^not compel either party to agree 
to a proposal or require the making of a concession." 
(emphasis supplied) 
The duty to execute ^ a^written agreement is in no way affected 
by any limitation on this, Bo:ard's power to enforce collective bar-
gaining agreements or to dispose of claims of alleged violations 
2 Somers Faculty Association, 3 PERB 13084 (1970); Yohkers 
' Federation of Teachers, 8 PERB 113020 (1975) . 
6354 
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of such agreements. A refusal to execute a written agreement, 
upon request, incorporating the agreement reached, is a refusal 
to bargain in good faith; it is an improper practice, distinct 
from •'••questions.-:, of the enforcement of the executed written 
agreement. In most cases involving a charge of refusal to execute 
a written agreement, the dispute is as to whether there was a 
meeting of the minds concerning a-particular- -term- or condition- ofL-
employment. If the Board determines that the parties did in fact 
reach agreement as to the disputed item, the Board will direct the 
parties to execute a written agreement containing provisions which 
' 3 
reflect the substance of that agreement. 
The question of first impression presented by this case is 
whether the Association's duty to bargain in good faith was ful-
filled when the memorandum of agreement was signed and ratified. 
We conclude that it was not. We look to the intent of the parties, 
as determined by their established custom or by the reasonable 
implications of the language they have used to memorialize the 
agreement they reached in negotiations. 
In this case, there is no dispute that the practice of the 
parties in the past has been to prepare and execute a basic con-
tract in a single document in accordance with the terms of a memo-
randum of agreement such as that involved here, and to execute 
that document. There is no dispute that the parties intended 
this time, as they had done in the past, to execute a final formal 
single written contract as the ultimate step of their negotiations. 
3_ Yonkers Federation of Teachers, supra. 
;* /"> £*% g^V » W 
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While the Association is ready to execute a written contract in a 
single document, it is not willing to do so in the final form 
necessary to implement the language of the memorandum. In these 
circumstances, we find that the Association is required to execute 
such a single instrument, if the evidence shows that there has 
been a complete meeting of the minds as to how the particular 
-item should be placed in that document r In- so -finding, we do- not 
hold that the Taylor Law prescribes the particular method, form 
or style to be used for incorporating final agreements in all 
situations. 
While the use of the memorandum of agreement as a device to 
memorialize agreements reached -- often at a late hour after 
protracted negotiations --is to be encouraged, nevertheless, it 
cannot be recognized in all instances as the end of the parties' 
negotiating responsibility. Where, as here, the parties contem-
plated incorporating all unchanged terms of the prior contract 
and all changes as specified in the memorandum of agreement into 
a final single agreement, the duty to negotiate in good faith 
requires the execution of such a document. In our view, the 
basic policy of the Act --to promote harmonious and cooperative 
relations between public employers and public employees -- is best 
4 
served by such a requirement. 
We now turn to the question of whether the parties have 
agreed as to the form in which their agreement concerning new 
4 In so.holding, we do not question the enforceability of the 
contractual commitments contained in the memorandum of agree-
ment for purposes other than those prescribed by §204.3 of the 
Taylor Law, nor do we intend any change in the "contract bar" 
requirements of the Act and our Rules. ' NY State Thruway 
Authority, 10 PERB 1f4019 (1977). 
OoQO 
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service steps would be incorporated in the final single instru-
ment and, if so, what that agreement was. The answer to that 
question is in the parties' memorandum of agreement. That docu-
ment is clear and unambiguous. Indeed, no clearer language could 
be adopted to evidence the parties' agreement that the new service 
steps would actually be added to the salary schedules: "new ser-
vice -steps shall be-incorporatedinto^^ the salary schedule. ..". " 
The Association's position that all it is required to do is to 
execute a final agreement containing the language of the memoran-
dum of agreement, in haec verba, must be rejected. This position 
distorts the purpose and intent of the memorandum of agreement,--
which is basically a list of instructions for the preparation of 
the final contract -- and is inconsistent with the plain meaning 
of the words of the memorandum of agreement. The Association 
should be directed to execute a final contract which adds the new 
service steps to the salary schedule. 
We do not, however, agree with the District that the 
Association's duty includes execution of an agreement specifying 
the effect of the prior wage freeze on the new service steps to 
be incorporated in the salary schedule. The memorandum of agree-
ment is silent on this matter. Nor is there any indication that 
the parties agreed during their negotiations prior to the execu-
tion of the memorandum of agreement to include such language in 
their contract. This question does involve a matter of interpre-
tation and application of the memorandum of agreement over which 
this Board does not have jurisdiction. We in no way intend by our. 
decision to indicate any position with regard to the intent of the 
Board - U-4321 -9 
parties concerning the effect of the wage freeze on their agree-
ment to incorporate the new service steps in the salary schedule. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER (1) the Deer Park Teachers 
Association to negotiate in good faith by 
executing a final contract for the years 
1979 through 1982 which adds the new service 
steps -to the salary schedtile in a manner 
consistent with the parties' agreement as 
described herein, and 
(2) that the charge of the Deer Park Union 
Free School District be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in all other respects. 
DATED: July 16, 1980 
Albany, New York 
arold R." Newman 
&U. #A>~<^ 
^iS^^^^— 
I d a K l a u s , Member 
iteS 
David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CAYUGA-ONONDAGA BOCES TEACHERS 
ASSOCIATION, : 
Respondent, : 
-and- : 
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL : 
SERVICES for CAYUGA-ONONDAGA 
COUNTIES, • : 
Charging Party.: 
HARRY SLYWIAR, for Respondent 
GARRY A. LUKE, for Charging Party 
On February 15, 1979, the Board of Cooperative Educational 
Services for Cayuga-Onondaga Counties (BOCES) filed a charge 
alleging that the Cayuga-Onondaga BOCES Teachers Association 
(Association) refused to negotiate in good faith in violation of 
§209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act. The 
essence of the charge was that the Association sought to bypass 
the duly appointed BOCES negotiating committee and negotiate 
directly with the BOCES Board of Education. 
After a hearing, the hearing officer issued a decision in 
which he dismissed the charge. In his decision, the hearing v :'".,.': 
officer noted that,;:this/:;is a case of first impression, prior 
decisions of this Board having dealt only with an employer by-
passing an employee organization and negotiating directly with its 
employees. In that type of situation, PERB has found such conduct 
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to interfere with employee rights in violation of §209-a.l(a) of 
the Act. Buffalo Board of Education, 6 PERB H3051 (1973). The 
hearing officer reasoned that a similar bypass by an employee 
organization should likewise be a violation. Upon analyzing the 
facts, the hearing officer concluded that after the parties had 
been at impasse for some time, the Association sought to pressure 
the- Board to- modify its negotiating position and-to- more actively 
involve its members in the negotiations, but that it did not 
evidence an intent to deal with the Board rather than its team. 
He therefore dismissed the charge. 
We agree with the hearing officer's decision to dismiss the 
charge and, therefore, reject the exceptions to that decision filed 
by the BOCES. 
In our view, the Association simply appealed to the Board to 
modify the position of its designated negotiating team, but 
without refusing to deal with that team. Thus, the Association 
did not attempt to dictate to the employer the choice of its 
representative or to reject the authority of that representative. 
Having reviewed the entire record, we find, as did the hearing 
officer, that the Association did not refuse to negotiate with the 
BOCES team. Such conduct, particularly as it occurred when the 
parties had long been at impasse, was not an unreasonable or 
improper effort to resolve a stalemate. 
In addition to asserting in its exceptions that the hearing 
officer's decision is incorrect on the merits, the BOCES claims 
that certain conduct of the hearing officer demonstrated bias on 
his part. We find no valid basis for sustaining that claim. 
I 6860 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
July 16, 1980 
-3 
*£<«£&««• 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
gfe^l /£^£*«^-
I d a K l a u s , Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
Case Nos 
In the Matter of 
PENN YAN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD : BOARD DECISION & ORDER 
OF- EDUCATION, -. -
Respondent, 
-and-
PENN YAN TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
U-3816/U-3924 
HARRIS, BEACH, WILCOX, RUBIN AND 
LEVY (Susan S. Robfogel, Esq., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
PAUL E. KLEIN, ESQ.(Robert D. 
Clearfield, Esq., of Counsel) for 
Charging Party 
HENRY F. SABOTA, ESQ. for New York 
State School Boards Association, 
amicus curiae 
The Penn Yan Teachers Association (PYTA) duly filed charges 
alleging that the Penn Yan Central School District Board of Edu-
cation (District) violated §§209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public Em-
ployees' Fair Employment Act. In substance, the charges alleged 
that the District unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of 
employment of its teachers when it refused to accept their res-
ignations from extracurricular activities, submitted en masse by 
Board - U-3816/U-3924 -2 
most of the teachers of the District; refused to negotiate, upon 
demand, the impact of this unilateral change in terms and condi-
tions of employment; and interfered with the rights of the tea-
chers to be represented by the charging party by refusing to 
accept their resignations and writing to them individually to 
advise them that their resignations were not accepted and that 
they "were expected ^ 
extracurricular assignments. 
After a.'^ hearing, the. hearing officer issued a decision in 
which she found that the District had not changed its practice of 
dealing with resignations from extracurricular assignments. The 
evidence before her showed that in past years there had been vir-
tually no resignations duringr.the period of the assignments and 
that during the period of the mass resignations (January through 
March 1979), one proffered resignation was accepted by the 
District because of the particular "unique circumstances" in-
volved. Accordingly, she dismissed that part of the charge 
alleging unilateral change in a term and condition of employment 
in violation of §209-a.l(d). She also dismissed that portion of 
the charge which alleged that the District, in refusing to accept 
the resignations and in sending individual letters to the teachers, 
violated §209-a.l(a) of the Act by interfering with their pro-
tected rights'. In this regard, the hearing officer noted that 
: l 
the District was merely reacting to a threatened strike. The 
1_ The mass resignations were part of various concerted activities 
to protest the status of negotiations which had begun in 
February. 1978, for a successor agreement to one that expired 
on June 30, 1978. 
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hearing officer found, however, that the District, which con-
cededly refused to negotiate the alleged impact of its refusal to 
accept the resignations, violated §209-a.l(d) by such refusal. 
The District filed exceptions to the hearing officer's 
2 
decision, but the PYTA did not. 
After reviewing the exceptions of the District, the response: 
of PYTA, and the entire record, we reverse that portion of the 
hearing officer's decision which holds that the District refused 
to negotiate in good faith by refusing to negotiate the impact 
of its rejection of the resignations. The hearing officer, after 
specifically finding that the PYTA did not establish that the 
District dealt with these resignations any differently than it 
had dealt with any other attempted resignations in the past, 
properly concluded that there had been no unilateral change in 
terms and conditions of employment. The basis for this finding 
seems to be not so much that there was an established practice 
which was not changed, but rather, that there was no clear prac-
tice. From this premise, however, the hearing officer reasoned 
that the District's rejection of the resignations made the PYTA 
aware for the first time that the District's position regarding 
extracurricular assignments was different than its own, the 
District's position being that the teachers could not resign at 
will and the PYTA's position being that they could. She there-
fore concluded that the PYTA had the right to negotiate its claim 
2_ The PYTA filed a document which it labeled "cross-exceptions", 
which only constituted a response to the District's excep-
tions. In its brief in support of its "cross-exceptions", 
the PYTA specifically accepts the hearing officer's decision. 
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of impact on terms and conditions of employment of the District's 
action. The record does not show what kind of "impact" PYTA 
sought to negotiate. It would appear, however, that it wished to 
resolve this difference of positions. 
We view the matter differently. There having been vir-
• tually no resignations from extracurricular assignments in past 
years, it is clear to us that the PYTA as well as the District 
knew that the expectation of the teachers and the District was 
that the. assignments, when made, would have to be completed. That 
was, in our view of the evidence, the past practice. Since the 
District's rejection of the mass resignations was not a change in 
a past practice, there was no reason for prior negotiations, and, 
in any event, no basis for any impact negotiations. 
More fundamentally, there are substantial policy reasons 
implicit in the statutory prohibition against strikes which require 
that we not find an obligation on the part of the employer to nego-
tiate under these circumstances. The District's action in rejec-
ting the mass resignations was nothing more than a reasonable 
effort to prevent what the hearing officer properly found would be 
3 
a strike. Even if it were shown that at times individuals were 
permitted to proffer resignations which were accepted, this would i.\ 
not, in any way, excuse the refusal of all employees en masse to 
perform the assignment which they were expected to perform. Such 
mass resignation would be tantamount to a strike. To rule that the 
3 Plainedge Federation of Teachers, 11 PERB 1f3060 (1978). 
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employer's refusal to accept the mass resignations imposed an 
obligation on its part to negotiate, as the PYTA apparently urges, 
would impede employers from taking reasonable action to avert 
threatened strikes, a result inconsistent with the policies of 
the Act. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charges herein be, and 
they hereby are, dismissed in all respects. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
July 16, 1980 
Harold R.Newman,Chairman 
Au. ftAj**^ 
I da Kl aus", Memb e r 
David U. 'Randies, 
#2D-7/16/80 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF NEW ROCHELLE, 
Respondent, 
-and-
POLICE ASSOCIATION OF NEW ROCHELLE, NEW YORK, 
INC. , 
Charging Party 
RAINS AND POGREBIN, ESQS. (PAUL J. 
SCHREIBER, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Respondent 
HARTMAN AND LERNER, ESQS. (REYNOLD 
A. MAURO, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Charging Party 
The charge herein was filed by the Police Association of 
New Rochelle, New York, Inc. (Association) on September 8, 1978. 
It alleges that the City of New Rochelle (City) violated Section 
209-a.l of the Act by reassigning to civilians certain duties 
previously assigned to police officers. 
The matter was submitted to the hearing officer upon a 
stipulated set of facts which his decision sets forth in material 
detail. Briefly, in October, 1976, the City commenced using 
twelve civilian Community Service Workers (GSWs) for purposes of 
traffic control, taking minor property and theft reports, aiding 
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the sick and injured, and responding to calls regarding possible 
violation of certain minor general ordinances - duties previously 
performed by police officers. Use of the civilians enabled the 
reassignment p'f7 three police officers from traffic control duties 
to squad work. No improper practice charge was filed in response 
to the City's action. 
On August 1, 1978, the City Police Commissioner promulgated 
"General Order No. 13" which established geographical posts to be 
covered by the CSWs and enumerated their duties. The latter were 
of the same nature as those that had been performed by CSWs since 
1976. 
In addition to the duties listed in the General Order, 
CSWs have been assigned in place of police officers to station-
house desk duty, making visual observation of the cellblock "bull-
pen" area. Assignment of CSWs to desk duty freed five police :::•'. 
officers for other police duties. 
The utilization of CSWs by the City has not resulted in a 
layoff of police officers. Nor has it had any adverse impact on 
the wages, hours or working conditions of police officers, although > 
it has resulted in the deployment of some officers from station-
louse desk work and traffic control to other police duties. 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge. He found that 
since the assignments contained in General Order No. 13 had been 
performed by CSWs since 1976, well over four months prior to the 
Association's filing of the instant charge, the only issue to be 
Board Decision -3- U-3509 
decided was the propriety of the assignment of stationhouse desk 
duties to CSWs. As regards the latter assignment, he found that 
its principal and predominant effect was not upon terms and condi-
tions of employment of the police officers, but rather upon mat-
ters concerning government policy. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the decision of the hearing officer. The parties' 
stipulation that General Order No. 13 simply listed duties of a 
type which had been performed by civilians since 1976 renders 
untimely that aspect of the charge as challenges the assignments 
contained therein,— and thus permits consideration only of such 
aspect of the charge as protests the assignment of CSWs to station-
house duties. 
Recently, in both County of Suffolk, 12 PERB If3123, and 
City of Albany, 13 PERB 1(3011, we held, under factual circumstances 
iimaterially identical to those presented here, that a public em-
ployer's assignment to civilians of duties previously performed 
by police officers is not, in itself, a mandatory subject of nego-
tiation. In those cases, we deemed it significant that no police 
— Even were this aspect of the charge timely, we would dismiss 
it on the merits for the reasons stated in this decision on 
the merits of the remaining charge. 
6069 
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officers were laid off or otherwise adversely affected by the em-
2/ ployer's conduct,— and thus found that the action complained of 
primarily involved not terms and conditions of employment, but 
rather the fundamental management right to determine the necessary 
employment qualifications of personnel performing the tasks at 
issue. Since the reassignment of duties here contested simply 
caused five police officers to be deployed to other law enforce-
ment duties, the instant case presents ho distinguishing circum-
stances . 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
Dated, Albany, New York 
July 16, 1980 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Chai airman 
«%&£. /dL \*A*4*' 
Ida Klaus, Member 
2/ 
— In its exceptions, petitioner claims that some layoffs resulted 
from the use of CSWs. Such a claim, however, is directly con-
tradicted by the stipulation of facts, which states that "no 
police officers have been laid off as a result of the use of 
CSWs." While it was also stipulated that ten officers were 
laid off in January 1976, this was some ten months prior to 
the institution of the CSW force, and it was further stipu-
lated that all ten were rehired by the end of 1976. In any 
event, those layoffs would relate to an aspect of the charge 
which has been found to be untimely. 
STATS OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY 
OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY), 
Respondent, 
- and-
THE CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and-
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
Intervenor. 
JOSEPH BRESS, ESQ. (WILLIAM F. COLLINS, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH (MARJORIE KAROWE, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (SUSAN BLOOM JONES, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Intervenor 
BACKGROUND 
On October 25, 1975, the State of New York (State) issued an 
instruction to the presidents of its colleges, including the 
State University of New York at Albany, which directed the absence 
of employees who were not needed on November 28, 1975, the day 
following Thanksgiving Day. It further provided:"Employees who 
are directed not to report to work may charge this absence to 
accumulated leave credits. Employees who have exhausted all leave 
credits or who opt not to charge leave credits for this absence 
should be placed on leave without pay for the day." The reason 
given by the State for directing the absence of the employees was 
6OHM-it 0*'l 
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that they were not needed because the University was not in sessior 
on the day following Thanksgiving Day and that, by their not 
reporting for work, the University would conserve energy. 
The Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA), then 
the representative of the employees who were directed to absent 
themselves, protested the direction by filing a grievance alleging 
a violation of their collective bargaining agreement. It filed 
no improper practice charge. At that time, the State and CSEA 
were in negotiations for an agreement to succeed one that was 
due to expire on March 31, 1976. In November 1975, during those 
negotiations, CSEA proposed an amendment of Article 10.12 of the 
prior agreement which is entitled "Absence - Extraordinary Cir-
cumstances." The proposal was to add the following language: 
"When an agency or department is closed and 
an employee is directed not to report for 
duty or the employee reports for work and 
is "directed to leave his or her work station 
there shall be no time charged to accruals." 
The State did not at that time respond to this proposal of CSEA, 
as the parties' discussions focused on other aspects of the nego-
tiations. In fact, no negotiations were held on the proposal and 
when, in March 1976, outstanding issues were submitted to con-
ciliation, this proposal was not included among them. When, in 
June 1976, the State and CSEA reached an agreement, their agree-
ment did not include the proposal and contained no reference to 
the subject matter of the proposal. 
CSEA did press its grievance concerning the 1975 directed 
absences of the employees, and, on May 7, 1976, an arbitrator 
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determined that the State's conduct had not violated the parties' 
agreement.— 
Charge U-2462 
In September 1976, the State once again directed that non-
essential employees not report for work on the day following 
Thanksgiving Day, which, in 1976,- fell on-November 26; This- time 
CSEA filed a charge alleging that the State violated its duty to 
negotiate in good faith in that it unilaterally changed a term 
2/ 
and condition of employment (Case No. U-2462).— In response to 
the charge and before any hearing, the State moved to dismiss the 
charge on the ground that its action was authorized by the parties' 
contract as interpreted by the arbitrator. Indicating that the 
arbitrator's decision did not resolve the issue as to whether CSEA 
had waived its right to negotiate the matter and that that issue 
could not be resolved without a hearing on the facts, we denied 
-*, -• 3/ the motion.— 
— When, in subsequent years, the State again directed the absence 
of employees on the day following Thanksgiving Day, other 
grievances were brought and other arbitrators concluded that 
the State's conduct xvas not inconsistent with its contractual 
obligations. 
2/ 
— The Public Employees Federation intervened in this and the two 
subsequent proceedings after its displacement of CSEA as the 
. representative of the Professional, Scientific and Technical 
Services Unit, which includes some of the employees whose non-
attendance was directed. 
-I 11 PERB 113026. 
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Charge U-3221 
In 1977, the State again directed that nonessential employees 
be absent on the day following Thanksgiving Day (November 25, 1977) 
and CSEA, again, filed an improper practice charge (Case No.U-3221). 
The charges in U-2462 and U-3221 were consolidated for decision by 
the hearing officer. On November 13, 1979, he determined that the 
State's conduct constituted a violation of its duty to negotiate 
in good faith. He ordered the State to cease and desist from con-
tinuing to direct its employees not to report to work on the day 
following Thanksgiving Day and from continuing to charge such 
4 
absences to leave without pay or to accrued leave credits. 
Charge U-3777 
In 1978, the State once again directed that nonessential 
employees of the University not report to work on the day following 
Thanksgiving Day (November 24, 1978) and, once again, CSEA filed 
an improper practice charge (Case No. U-3777). Little more than 
two weeks after he issued his consolidated decision in Cases U-2462 
and U-3221, the hearing officer issued his decision in this case. 
Finding the issues of fact and law to be identical with those 
earlier cases, he reached the same conclusions. 
6374 
4 The hearing officer did not propose any remedy that would make 
the employees whole for any losses they might have suffered by 
reason of the directed absences in 1976 and 1977, relying on 
record evidence that in the past a majority of the employees 
who had been scheduled to work on .'.the day following Thanksgiving 
Day had chosen to take leave on that day. He reasoned that a 
make-whole remedy was inappropriate because it would have to be 
based upon speculation as to which employees would have chosen 
to work on the days in question were it not for the State's 
directive. CSEA and the intervenor have filed exceptions in 
which they argue that the hearing officer has.not proposed an 
adequate remedy. In view of our decision, we have not consid-
ered these exceptions. 
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The State has filed exceptions in all three cases, in support 
of which it argues that the hearing officer was in error when he 
determined that its conduct constituted a violation of its duty 
to negotiate in good faith. We have consolidated all three for 
decision. 
DISCUSSION 
In ouriintefimadeclsion in Case No. -U-2462 (11 PERB 1(3026), 
we referred to the subject matter involved in this dispute as 
"unpaid furloughs" and, as. such, recognizedit to be a mandatory 
subject of negotiation. For the purposes of this final decision, 
based on a full evidentiary hearing, it is necessary to define 
the subject more precisely. The State dild two things when it 
directed employees not to report to work on the day after 
Thanksgiving. First,:it directed their absence, and second, it 
directed them to charge the absence to accumulated leave credits 
or, for those who may have exhausted all leave credits, it directed 
that they be placed on leave without pay for the day. As to the 
first, the power to direct absences from work is, by itself, not 
a mandatory subject of negotiation. The record shows', that the 
State has directed absences from work in other instances, for rea-
sons other than that for the day after'(.Thanksgiving absences. 
CSEA has not, in this proceeding, presented any evidence that it 
seriously challenges the right of the State to direct absences, as 
such. 
The second aspect of the State's action is, however, a proper 
subject for negotiation since it involves the impact of the 
directed absence on terms and conditions of employment of the 
affected employees. Whether the affected employees will be paid 
Board - U-2462/U-3221/U-3777 - 6 
for the day or not, whether they must charge the day to leave 
credits or not, clearly must be negotiated upon proper demand. 
Indeed, the evidence in the record demonstrates that CSSA's concerr 
is not whether the State, for good business reasons, can direct an 
employee not to come to work, but whether it can do so without pay-
ing- -the employee.Thus , CSEA here seeks the right -to negotiate the 
impact of the State's decision to direct absences on the day after 
Thanks giving. 
As we indicated in our interim decision, the critical issue 
is whether, in the light of the history of negotiations, CSEA 
has waived its right to such negotiations. On the particular 
facts before us, we disagree with the conclusions of the hearing 
officer in this regard and find that the totality of CSEA's con-
duct in 1975, 1976 and 1977 constituted a waiver of its right to 
negotiate the impact of the State's directed absences in 1976, 
1977 and 1978. Accordingly, the improper practice charges in 
these proceedings must be dismissed. 
At the outset, it should be emphasized that the alleged 
violation by the State- is that it took unilateral action with 
respect to a mandatory subject of negotiations and not that it 
refused a demand to negotiate the proposal. It should also be 
emphasized that the State first took the action complained of in 
October 1975, but CSEA did not file an improper practice charge 
with regard to that unilateral action. CSEA had clear and explicit 
notice during the month preceding Thanksgiving Day in 1975 of the 
State's intention to direct absences without pay that year. It 
W 4 D 
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had an opportunity to protest to the employer or to seek to 
negotiate with it as to the matter. During the course of negotia-
tions in 1975 for an agreement to take effect on April 1, 1976, 
CSEA proposed a clause that would have prohibited charges to 
accruals when an employee is directed not to report to work. How-
ever, CSEA did not pursue that impact demand either in negotiations 
or in any aspect of conciliation. Later, after failing to prevail 
in arbitration, it entered into an agreement containing no restric-
tion on the State's powers even though it knew that the arbitrator 
had sustained the State's position that it had the right under the 
earlier agreement to direct the absences and presumably to charge 
the time to accrual leave or to leave without pay. If CSEA 
believed that its earlier agreement barred the State from taking 
such action, it is inexplicable that CSEA failed to pursue the 
matter in negotiations for subsequent agreements including a 
failure to pursue its position in negotiations for the agreement 
to take effect on April 1, 1977. 
Under these circumstances, CSEA may not be heard to complain 
that the State's actions were taken without prior negotiations 
with it. • County of Rehs s e Taer, 8 PERB 1f3039 (1975). By failing 
to file an improper practice charge relating to the State's 1975 
action and by failing to pursue its negotiation proposal in 1975 
and 19 76 even after the ruling of the arbitrator, CSEA must be 
deemed to have acquiesced in the employer's position that it had 
a right to act unilaterally thereafter during the term of the 1976 
agreement. Thus CSEA waived its right to protest the State's 
action as to the day after Thanksgiving Day in the year covered 
by the 1976 contract. When, with the State's position and claim 
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of right even more clear by further notice to it of similar 
proposed action, it did not pursue the matter during the negoti-
ations for the 1977 contract, it waived its right to protest the 
State's action in the two years covered by that contract. These 
are the three years covered by the charges. Accordingly, the 
State did not by its actions in 1976, 1977, and 1978 violate its 
— """57"" """ " 
duty to negotiate in good faith.— 
We do not agree with the hearing officer that the facts of 
this case are governed by our decision in County of Orange, 
12 PERB 113114 (1979) or that the decision of the NLRB in The Press 
Co., Inc., 121 NLRB 976 (1958), which we cited with approval in 
County of Orange, requires that we find that CSEA did not waive its 
right to negotiate the.': matter of the _-use of accrued leave or 
leave without pay for directed absences during the term of the 
contract. 
— Although we hold that CSEA's failure to pursue its negotiation 
proposal after the State's conduct in 1975 and, especially, 
after the arbitrator's award in 1976, while negotiations were 
still in progress, constituted a waiver of its right to nego-
tiate as to the subject, we do not intend any implication 
that the action taken by the State in 1975, when committed, was 
itself consistent with its Taylor Law obligations. That ques-
tion is not before us becaus.e CSEA filed no charge regarding 
the 1975 action. 
6378 
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The State did not, as did the employer in County of Orange, 
merely indicate in vague terms that it contemplated action; here 
the State clearly announced the action that it proposed to take 
and did in fact take. Iri County' of Orange, we agreed that mere 
discussion of contemplated action during negotiations did not con-
stitute a waiver of the right to negotiate during the term of the 
subsequent contract otherwise silent on the subject. Here, how-
ever, in response to the State's announced action, the CSEA sub-
mitted a proposal in negotiations for the subsequent contract that 
would have covered the matter. Furthermore, CSEA did not file an 
improper practice charge protesting the unilateral action in 1975. 
This is clearly not the same factual pattern presented to us in 
County of Orange, nor to the NLRB in The P'ress Co. Inc. 
Our decision in this case does not "permit an employer to 
avoid its duty to negotiate certain matters by raising them in 
casual discussions during negotiations." (County of Orange,p. 3207 
Nor does it require an employee organization "to press the negoti-
ation of any subject thus raised or be deemed to have waived its 
right to negotiate the subject later" (ibid, p. 3207). The 
circumstances here are far different. The employer's unilateral 
action under a claim of contractual right that was upheld by 
an arbitrator should have persuaded CSEA that the matter of the 
use of accrued leave or leave without pay for directed absences 
could not be overlooked during subsequent negotiations for a 
new contract if it was serious about the matter. Nothing said in 
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The Press Co., Inc. is inconsistent with our holding on the 
particular circumstances of this case. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charges herein.be, and 
they hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
July 15, 1980 
IDA KLAUS, Member 
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• PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATI -S BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WAYNE-FINGER LAKES BOARD OF COOPERATIVE 
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, 
Employer, 
- and -
WAYNE-FINGER LAKES ASSOCIATION OF 
SCHOOL SUPPORT PERSONNEL, 
P e t i t i o n e r . 
#3A-7/16/80' 
Case No. C-2014 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accordance 
with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules of 
Pjrocedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating repre-
sentative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public:. 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS.HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Wayne-Finger Lakes Association | 
of School Support Personnel | 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for • 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances-. . • 
Unit: Included: All regularly employed non-instructional personnel 
including stenographers, secretaries, teaching 
assistants, teacher aides, couriers, typists, 
computer operators, computer programmers., keypunch 
operators, clerks, repair assistants, head cus-
todians, custodians and cleaners. 
Excluded: [see attached] 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that•the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Wayne-Finger Lakes Association 
of, School Support Personnel 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 15th day of 
Albany, New York 
July, 198 0 
g^fSTt^potf^y 
fiarold.R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
Dn.vi d C. Riindli?;!,' Membat 
[C-2014 Wayne-Finger Lakes BOCES] 
Excluded: District Superintendent of Schools, Assistant 
Superintendent, Business Administrator, Adminis-
trative Assistants, Directors, Assistant 
Directors, Public Relations Per son,.Principals, 
all certificated persons except teaching assis-
tants, non-teaching coordinators, supervisor of 
buildings and grounds, supervisor of operations 
of the regional computer center, clerk of the 
board of education, treasurer, secretary to the 
District Superintendent, secretaries to the 
Assistant Superintendent, secretary to the 
Business Administrator and secretary to the 
Administrative Assistant to the District Super-
intendent . 
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NEW "YORK STATE 
P U B L I C EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
5 0 "WOLF ROAD 
ALBANY, NEW YOHK 12205 
COUNSEL 
MARTIN i_. BARR 
July 16, 1980 
Ms. Vera Diane Stein 
346 East 76th Street 
New York, New York 10021 
Re: Case No.. U-4375—NYC Board 
of Education 
Dear Ms. Stein: 
Your letter of June 24, 1980, addressed to Mr. Milowe, 
in which you request an extension of time in which to file 
exceptions to the Hearing Officer's Decision dated January 28, 
1980 in the above designated proceeding was referred to the 
Board for their consideration. The Board has directed me to 
advise you that, under the Rules of this Board, your request 
for an extension of tine to file exceptions cannot now be 
granted. 
Very truly yours. 
IIA.U/ 
Martin L. Barr 
Counsel 
MLB:gme 
cc: Hugh Haughey, Esq., NYC Board of Education, Office of Labor 
Relations, 110 Livingston Street, Brooklyn, New York 11201 
Attn: Jack Schloss, Esq. 
Jarss R. Sandner, Esq., NYSUT, 260 Park Avenue South, 
New York, New York 10010 Attn: Elizabeth Truly, Esq. 
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